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UNIVALENT FOUNDATIONS AS A FOUNDATION FOR
MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE
Abstract. I prove that invoking the univalence axiom is equivalent to
arguing ‘without loss of generality’ within Propositional Univalent Founda-
tions (PropUF), the fragment of Univalent Foundations (UF) in which all
homotopy types are mere propositions. As a consequence, I argue that prac-
ticing mathematicians, in accepting ‘without loss of generality’ (WLOG) as
a valid form of argument, implicitly accept the univalence axiom and that
UF rightly serves as a Foundation for Mathematical Practice. By contrast,
ZFC is inconsistent with WLOG as it is applied, and therefore cannot serve
as a foundation for practice.
Introduction. It has been noted for some time that symmetry arguments,
often signaled in a mathematical proof by the turn of phrase ‘without loss of
generality’ or simply WLOG, are inconsistent with existing formal systems of
mathematics. Quoting Barwise [Bar89, p. 849],
“[C]urrent formal models of proof are severely impoverished [...].
For example, [...] proofs where one establishes one of several
cases and then observes that the others follow by symmetry
considerations [constitute] a perfectly valid (and ubiquitous)
form of mathematical reasoning, but I know of no system of
formal deduction that admits of such a general rule.” [Daw15]
Along similar lines, Awodey writes,
“Within a mathematical theory, theorem, or proof, it makes no
practical difference which of two ‘isomorphic copies’ are used,
and so they can be treated as the same mathematical object for
all practical purposes. This common practice is even sometimes
referred to light-heartedly as ‘abuse of notation,’ and math-
ematicians have developed a sort of systematic sloppiness to
help them implement this principle, which is quite useful in
practice, despite being literally false. It is, namely, incompati-
ble with conventional foundations of mathematics in set theory.”
[Awo14, p. 2]
The kind of argument to which Barwise and Awodey allude is a staple of
mathematical reasoning, even at the highest level. For example, the phrase
“without loss of generality” appears twice in the proof of the Green–Tao the-
orem [GT08], once in Tao’s proof of the Erdős discrepancy problem [Tao16],
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seven times in Hairer’s work on regularity structures [Hai14], three times in
Gowers’s proof of the multidimensional Szemerédi theorem [Gow07], and twice
in Zhang’s proof of bounded gaps between primes [Zha14]. The list goes on.
Any reader who has taken a college-level math course has likely encountered,
and perhaps even produced, such an argument themselves. Could it really
be that these celebrated achievements by well-respected mathematicians and
many more mundane aspects of mathematical pedagogy are (in Awodey’s par-
lance) “sloppy” and “literally false”?
In fact, such arguments are likely much more prevalent than would be ap-
parent by a simple search for the phrase “without loss of generality” in math-
ematical papers. The form of argument can easily go unnoticed by generic
appeal to an “obvious” symmetry without explicit use of the phrase ‘without
loss of generality’. For an easy example, consider the claim: Every set contain-
ing exactly 3 distinct elements can be ordered in exactly 6 ways. To prove, let
{a1, a2, a3} be a generic set of 3 distinct elements. The possible orderings are
a1 < a2 < a3, a1 < a3 < a2, a2 < a1 < a3,(1)
a2 < a3 < a1, a3 < a1 < a2, a3 < a2 < a1,
for a total of 6. Since the elements of this set are arbitrary, the proof is
complete.
No practicing mathematician would quibble with the validity of this argu-
ment. The claim is obvious and the proof is trivial. If ever a mathematical
proof could be formally justified, it should be this one. But is the argument
given formally valid?
In specializing from the generic claim “Every set containing exactly 3 dis-
tinct elements” to a specific set {a1, a2, a3} and then generalizing the result
on the basis that these elements are “arbitrary”, the proof makes an implicit
(and apparently “sloppy”) appeal to symmetry that is worth a closer look.
The unspoken symmetry crops up when the elements of {a1, a2, a3} are de-
clared as “arbitrary”, which implies that any other distinct elements could be
substituted for a1, a2, a3 and the argument would go through mutatis mutan-
dis (i.e., once the necessary changes have been made).1 The validity of the
argument requires first that {a1, a2, a3} is equivalent (as a set) to every other
set containing 3 elements and second that the number of orderings of a set is
an invariant property under set-theoretic equivalence. As long as these two
criteria are met, the above argument holds. It is intuitively clear that these
1This step is itself ambiguous, leaving open the question as to what the “necessary changes”
are in a given setting. The working mathematician gets away with such turns of phrase
because the “necessary changes” are obvious to practitioners in the field, just as the “relevant
symmetries” are meant to be obvious when one invokes “without loss of generality”.
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criteria are met in the above example, but to what extent do they need to be
justified when giving a rigorous proof?
What is a Foundation of Mathematical Practice? Before going any fur-
ther, I should make clear what I mean by Foundation of Mathematical Practice.
Among philosophers of mathematics, a Foundation is generally understood as
an abstract “standard of rigor” in the sense that any mathematical statement
that is claimed to be true could (in principle) be expressed and shown to hold in
that Foundation. With this understanding, ZFC set theory has been adopted
as the de facto Foundation of Mathematics by most philosophers. Importantly,
the role of ZFC as a Foundation of Mathematics is to verify the truth of math-
ematical claims, irrespective of the validity of the argument given in support
of those claims.
A Foundation of Mathematical Practice, on the other hand, deals with the
latter issue of argumentation. As argumentation and proof are central to the
practice of mathematics, I understand a Foundation of Mathematical Practice
(FMP) to be a “standard of argument” in the sense that any argument that is
regarded as rigorous could (in principle) be expressed and shown to be valid
in that Foundation.
So whereas a Foundation of Mathematics deals with the truth of mathemat-
ical statements, a Foundation of Mathematical Practice deals with the validity
of mathematical arguments. Regardless of whether the above argument can
be translated into ZFC, the claim that any set with exactly 3 distinct ele-
ments can be ordered in exactly 6 ways can be shown to hold in ZFC. In fact,
the argument given is not formally valid in ZFC, but it is valid in Univalent
Foundations (UF), as I demonstrate below.
On this note, I ask if ZFC and/or UF can rightly be regarded as a Foundation
for mathematics as it is practiced. In particular, I consider whether a given
formal theory “permits [mathematicians] to do pretty much everything that it
would come naturally for them to do” [Bur15, p. 117], which includes treating
isomorphic objects as identical or distinct as they wish and applying standard
rules of inference (WLOG, induction, proof by contradiction) as they deem
appropriate. In the course of this discussion, I demonstrate, as the quotes by
Awodey and Barwise already suggest, that WLOG is inconsistent with ZFC set
theory, and therefore ZFC cannot serve as an FMP. I then prove that WLOG
is (in a precise sense) equivalent to Voevodsky’s axiom of univalence (UA)
in the Univalent Foundations (UF) [Uni, APW13], from which I argue that
UF is a suitable candidate for an FMP. Furthermore, the equivalence between
WLOG and UA provides a non-structuralist justification for the univalence
axiom, thus undermining prior attempts to level anti-structuralist criticisms,
à la Burgess [Bur15], against UF; see, e.g., [BT18]. In short, since WLOG and
UA are equivalent (see Theorem 1), and working mathematicians by and large
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accept WLOG as a valid form of argument, then working mathematicians
also implicitly accept the univalence axiom. But because WLOG is not an
overtly structuralist doctrine, the univalence axiom need not be regarded as
a structuralist axiom, as has been argued previously in [Awo14], and thus UF
(to the extent that it can be viewed as a Foundation of Mathematics) need
not be viewed as a strictly “structuralist foundation” [Tse16].
Without Loss of Generality. WLOG is one of the most useful techniques
in the working mathematician’s toolkit, allowing a proof of one special case
to stand in for perhaps infinitely many other ‘practically identical’ cases. For
the sake of this discussion, I define WLOG to be an argument of the following
form:
(WLOG) if P holds of A, then P holds of every B that is
practically identical to A.
In our opening example concerning the orderings of a set with 3 elements, A
is defined as {a1, a2, a3}, P (A) corresponds to “A can be ordered in exactly
6 ways”, and “B is practically identical to A” means that “B is in bijective
correspondence with A”. Expressed in this way, the argument given above fits
the structure of WLOG, and may be seen as justification for the conclusion
that P holds for all 3-element sets.
More generally the meaning of ‘practical identity’ depends on the domain
in which the argument is being applied, and thus requires special care in sys-
tems aiming to formalize all of mathematical practice. In number theory, 2/4,
3/6, and 4823/9646 can be treated as identical because they reduce to the
same ratio when expressed in lowest terms, namely 1/2; in homotopy theory,
R (with Euclidean topology) can be continuously deformed into • (with trivial
topology), making the two homotopically identical (i.e., homotopy equiva-
lent); in combinatorics, the set of directed graphs with n vertices is in bijec-
tive correspondence with, and thus is combinatorially identical to, the set of
{0, 1}-valued n × n matrices with zero on the diagonal; and in group theory
({0, 1, 2},+(mod 3)) is isomorphic (as a group) to any other representative of
the cyclic group of order 3.
In general, the ‘X theorist’ (number theorist, homotopy theorist, combi-
natorialist, group theorist, etc.) has his own notion of ‘X-theoretic equiva-
lence’ (e.g., numerical equivalence, equivalence up to continuous deformation,
bijective correspondence, group isomorphism, etc.) which gives sense to the
meaning of practical identity within ‘X theory’. It is this notion of X-theoretic
equivalence to which the mathematician appeals when arguing ‘without loss
of generality’ within the context of ‘X theory’: for any (X-theoretic) property
P and any (X-theoretic) structure A, if P holds of A then P holds of every
other (X-theoretic) structure B that is equivalent to A (within X theory). This
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X-theoretic implementation of WLOG can be expressed semi-formally as
(2) WLOGX ∀P ∀A (P (A)→ (∀B (A ∼X B)→ P (B))),
with A ∼X B indicating that A and B are ‘X-theoretically equivalent’ and the
restriction of P , A, and B to X-theoretic properties/structures left implicit.
Given the liberty with which mathematicians appeal to WLOG in their
native disciplines, and the ubiquity with which arguments along these lines
appear in proofs accepted as rigorous, a Foundation of Mathematical Prac-
tice should thus provide a formal basis in which WLOGX can be consistently
employed across all mathematical disciplines. In symbols, a Foundation of
Mathematical Practice should be a formal model for WLOGX for every con-
ceivable instantiation of X:
(3) FMP |= ∀X WLOGX .
Below I assess the merits of ZFC set theory and Univalent Foundations with
respect to their ability to satisfy (3).
ZFC is not a Foundation of Mathematical Practice. When formalized
in set theory, with all mathematical objects represented as (structured) sets,
the relevant version of ‘X-theoretic equivalence’ is given by ZFC’s axiom of
extensionality,
(Ext) (A =ZFC B)↔ ∀x ((x ∈ A)↔ (x ∈ B)).
In words, (Ext) states that two sets are identical only if they contain the same
elements, which in turn makes two mathematical structures (formalized as
sets in ZFC) ‘practically identical’ only if their set-theoretic representations
are identical as sets. With this definition of equivalence, WLOGX is expressed
formally as a second-order statement (not internal to ZFC) by
WLOGZFC ∀P ∀A (P (A)→ (∀B (A =ZFC B)→ P (B))) ,
where P is quantified over all set-theoretic properties. As written, WLOGZFC
is valid in ZFC—a predicate applied to equal inputs (A =ZFC B) produces
equal outputs—but its scope is too narrow to capture the spirit of ‘without
loss of generality’ as it is usually applied in practice.
Consider the following example from homotopy theory, with R equipped
with the Euclidean topology and • (the point) equipped with the trivial topol-
ogy. Homotopically, R and • (with respective topologies) are equivalent, since
each can be continuously deformed into the other, and thus any homotopical
properties proven of R can be transferred ‘without loss of generality’ to •.
Strictly speaking, however, the formal representatives of R and • in ZFC are
not identical as sets, i.e., R 6=ZFC •, and therefore WLOGZFC cannot be for-
mally applied to transfer properties between the two. So even though R and •
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are homotopy equivalent, the quantification over set-theoretic properties P in
WLOGZFC allows them to be distinguished within ZFC (e.g., the property ‘pi is
an element of the base set’ holds of R but not •), making it “literally false”, as
Awodey [Awo14] notes, to transfer properties between two equivalent represen-
tatives unless those representatives are themselves set-theoretically identical.
On the one hand, the concept of equality in ZFC is too strict to account
for the homotopy equivalence between R and •. On the other hand, the syn-
tax of ZFC is too loose in allowing one to state non-homotopical properties
(such as ‘pi is an element of the base set’) that are not preserved under homo-
topy equivalence. Similar observations can be made about the formalization
of combinatorial, topological, number theoretic, algebraic, etc. properties in
ZFC. For example, in our running example about the orderings of a set with
3 elements, the “arbitrary” set {a1, a2, a3} is not identical to any other “ar-
bitrary” set {a′1, a′2, a′3}. Therefore, while the argument WLOGZFC can be
applied, its application does not generalize to give the number of orderings of
any set other than that whose orderings are listed in (1). The conclusion that
every 3 element set can be ordered in exactly 6 ways does not follow from the
application of WLOGZFC. With these observations we see that WLOGZFC is
not consistent with ∀X WLOGX as it is used in practice, and therefore ZFC
is not a Foundation of Mathematical Practice in the sense of (3).
Structuralist foundations. This conflict between the norms of ZFC and the
mores of mathematical practice fly in the face of set-theoretic orthodoxy, and
in particular Burgess’s assessment of ZFC’s standing among mathematicians:
“Mathematicians acquiesced in the set-theoretic framework, mostly
without enthusiasm, doubtless in large part because the stan-
dard axiom system ZFC permits them to do pretty much every-
thing that it would come naturally for them to do in the way
of constructing new structures out of old, and permits the de-
duction of all the familiar principles of traditional mathematics
that had been put on any sort of rigorous basis over the pre-
ceding century. [...] In short, it permits the mathematician to
stop thinking about foundational questions.” [Bur15, p. 117]
Sure, mathematicians may not think about foundations—they’re too busy do-
ing math—but is this because they have stopped thinking about foundations,
or because they never started? In a random survey of mathematicians, of
whom I mean geometers, algebraists, probabilists, number theorists, topolo-
gists, combinatorialists, analysts, etc., one is likely to encounter few who know
the axiom of extensionality by name, fewer who can identify any connection
between set-theoretic foundations and their day-to-day work as mathemati-
cians, fewer still who do not make regular use of WLOG in what they consider
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to be rigorous arguments, and almost nobody who is concerned by the fact
that WLOG is incompatible with the set-theoretic framework. In short, it is
not the case that the set-theoretic framework “permits [mathematicians] to
do pretty much everything that it would come naturally for them to do”, and
mathematicians couldn’t care less.
The discrepancy between set-theoretic foundations and mathematical prac-
tice has motivated calls for structuralist foundations, as in Lawvere’s Elemen-
tary Theory of the Category of Sets [Law05] and the more recently proposed
Univalent Foundations [Uni]. Arguments for mathematical structuralism take
root in Benacerraf’s famous “antinomy” [TH17] of von Neumann’s and Zer-
melo’s construction of the natural numbers. As Benacerraf [Ben65] observed,
there are set-theoretic differences between the two constructions, e.g., 0 ∈ 2
when 2 = {0, 1} but 0 6∈ 2 when 2 = {1}. Thus, if expressed in set theory,
there is no formal way to reconcile the Zermelodist (who formalizes the ordinal
numbers as 0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {1}, . . .) to the Neumannian (who formalizes
the ordinals instead as 0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, . . .), even though the differ-
ence between the two has no bearing on what the natural numbers are meant
to represent in practice. To dispense with this formalistic conflict between Zer-
melodists and Neumannians, of which practicing mathematicians are neither,
Tsementzis [Tse16] argues for a structuralist foundation of mathematics whose
formal system makes it literally impossible to express “nonsensical” proper-
ties that have nothing to do with the structures being formalized, such as the
set-theoretic statement ‘1 ∈ 2’. The Univalent Foundations achieves precisely
this, first by formalizing all mathematical objects as homotopy types in ho-
motopy type theory (HoTT) and then by postulating the univalence axiom,
which asserts
(A ' B) ' (A =UF B)(4)
(homotopy) equivalence is (homotopy) equivalent to identity,
where A =UF B indicates that A and B are identical for the purpose of
practicing mathematics internally to UF.2
In making the statement ‘has the same structure as’ (formalized as A ' B)
itself have the same structure as (') the statement ‘is identical to’ (written
A =UF B), the univalence axiom is seen by some as a formal embodiment of
the structuralist philosophy, e.g., [Awo14,Tse16], and a resolution to Benacer-
raf’s conundrum. But critics of the Univalent Foundations, and mathematical
structuralism more generally, note that practicing mathematicians sometimes
2Formally, the univalence axiom asserts that a specific map (A =UF B) → (A ' B) is a
homotopy equivalence, as in [Uni, Axiom 2.10.3]. But these additional technicalities are not
needed when working in the fragment of UF relevant to the present discussion.
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behave as structuralists, and sometimes don’t, putting any hardline structural-
ist framework, and in particular structuralist arguments for UF, at odds with
mathematical practice. Contra structuralism, Burgess spins Benacerraf’s ob-
servation instead as an indifference of mathematicians to the identification of
mathematical structures:
“The number theorist, even in a first course, wants to take
certain background material for granted, and is generally in-
different as to where the background notions and results came
from. Moreover, Benacerraf is right that included in the scope
of this indifference is indifference as to the identity of the nat-
ural numbers, to which of the many isomorphic progressions is
‘the’ natural number system.” [Bur15, p. 145]
Burgess continues, “Structuralism errs in generalizing too far from [Benacer-
raf’s] initial correct observations [...].”
With respect to mathematical practice, Burgess has a point. While there
are times when the working mathematician is indifferent to how a particular
class of mathematical objects is identified (e.g., the Cauchy reals versus the
Dedekind reals, Zermelo’s versus von Neumann’s construction of the natural
numbers, the number 2/4 versus the number 1/2), there are others when it is
desirable to distinguish isomorphic structures (e.g., when counting the num-
ber of distinct 2-element subgroups of the Klein group). So while devoutly
non-structuralist arguments in favor of set-theoretic foundations are incon-
gruous with the practice of mathematicians (from college freshmen to Fields
medalists) who routinely appeal to structuralist rationale whenever they treat
isomorphic objects as identical or otherwise argue ‘by symmetry’, arguments
for the Univalent Foundations as a structuralist foundation [Tse16,Awo14] are
out of step with the thought process of mathematicians who may wish to dis-
tinguish isomorphic structures from time to time [BT18]. On this point, the
structuralist attitude underlying Awodey’s and Tsementzis’s support for the
Univalent Foundations, regardless of how well UF deals with Benacerraf’s and
similar problems, risks putting off practicing mathematicians who neither know
nor care about ‘structuralism’ but have grown comfortable with set-theoretic
notation and jargon (‘element’, ‘subset’, ∈, ⊂) in their own practice.
To make the case for Univalent Foundations on practical grounds, I argue
that the univalence axiom need not be interpreted as a structuralist axiom at
all, and thus the Univalent Foundations need not be regarded as a structuralist
foundation. To this end, I prove that for all practical purposes invoking the
univalence axiom is equivalent to arguing ‘without loss of generality’ (WLOG),
which both establishes UF as a Foundation of Mathematical Practice, in the
sense of (3), and offers a non-structuralist justification for UF that differs from
the earlier structuralist arguments in [Awo14,Tse16].
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Univalent Foundations as a Foundation of Mathematical Practice. I
prove here that the univalence axiom and WLOG are identical within Propo-
sitional Univalent Foundations (or PropUF for short), which is the fragment
of UF with homotopy types restricted to mere propositions [Uni, Chapter 3].
Whereas UF takes a universe U of homotopy types as its basic objects, which
in full generality can have the structure of an∞-groupoid (containing objects,
paths between objects, paths between paths, paths between paths between
paths, and so on all the way ‘up to ∞’), Propositional UF contains only ho-
motopy types with at most a single unique inhabitant up to homotopy. The
universe of objects in PropUF is thus the subset PropU :≡
∑
A:U isProp(A) of
all A : U satisfying
isProp(A) :≡ ∏
x,y:A
(x =A y).3
Because current mathematical practice is primarily concerned with whether or
not a mathematical statement is true or false, the restriction here to Propo-
sitional UF is most relevant for assessing the role of UF as a foundation for
mathematical practice.4
Since all mathematical objects are interpreted as homotopy types in PropUF,
the relevant interpretation of ‘X-theoretic equivalence’ is given by homotopy
equivalence, denoted A ' B and defined formally as
(5) A ' B :≡ ∑
f :A→B
 ∑
g:B→A
(f ◦ g ∼ idB)
× ( ∑
h:B→A
(h ◦ f ∼ idA)
)
.
According to (5), a homotopy equivalence between A and B is established
by producing a triple of maps (f, g, h) with f : A → B and g, h : B →
A together with proofs that f ◦ g is homotopic to the identity on B and
3In the syntax of HoTT, a term of isProp(A) is a map which takes a pair x, y : A to a proof
that x and y are identical (or, homotopically, points x and y in A to a path between them).
The terms of PropU are pairs 〈A, p〉 consisting of a type A : U and a proof p : isProp(A)
that A is a proposition. Since isProp is itself a proposition, and thus has just one unique
inhabitant, all proofs of isProp(A) are identical, permitting the interpretation of PropU as
the subset of all A : U satisfying isProp(A).
4It is perhaps also notable that although HoTT does not assume the law of excluded middle
(LEM), and in fact is inconsistent with asserting LEM over the entire universe (LEM∞ :∏
A:U(A + ¬A)), it is consistent with assuming LEM for mere propositions. In particular,
PropUF is consistent with the additional axiom
LEM−1 :
∏
A:PropU
(A+ ¬A),
so that proof by contradiction is a valid form of argument in PropUF.
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h ◦ f is homotopic to the identity on A.5 To aid the proof, I define here
the Propositional Univalence Axiom (PropUA) in PropUF, which states that
homotopy equivalence is logically equivalent to identity for types that are mere
propositions:
(A ' B) ↔ (A =PropUF B)(6)
homotopy equivalence is logically equivalent to identity,
where in HoTT the expression ‘P ↔ Q’ is shorthand for the homotopy type
P ↔ Q :≡ (P → Q)× (Q→ P )
whose inhabitants are pairs of maps, one from P to Q and one from Q to P .
In general, homotopy equivalence implies logical equivalence, i.e., (A '
B) → (A ↔ B), making PropUA appear weaker than the univalence axiom
(4). But since all types in PropUF are mere propositions, and A ' B and
A ↔ B are mere propositions whenever A and B are mere propositions, it
readily follows (cf. [Uni, Lemma 3.3.3]) that logical equivalence of A and B is
logically equivalent to equivalence of their homotopy types in PropUF, giving
an inhabitant of
(7)
∏
A,B:PropU
(A ' B)↔ (A↔ B).
From this it is immediate that PropUA in (6) is homotopy equivalent (hence,
also logically equivalent) to the ostensibly stronger Univalence Axiom in (4).
The major claim here in establishing UF as a (not necessarily structuralist)
FMP is that WLOG (suitably expressed in PropUF) is equivalent to the Propo-
sitional Univalence Axiom, or equivalently the Univalence Axiom. Within
PropUF (where ‘X theory’ is homotopy type theory and ‘X-theoretic equiva-
lence’ is homotopy equivalence), WLOGX in (2) can be expressed internally
as
WLOGPropUF :≡
∏
P :PropU→PropU
∏
A:PropU
P (A)→ ∏
B:PropU
((A ' B)→ P (B))
 .
(8)
The formal assertion, from which I argue (3) for UF, is detailed in the following.
Theorem 1. WLOG and UA are equivalent in Propositional UF. In particu-
lar,
WLOGPropUF ' PropUA.(9)
5In HoTT, the statement f ∼ f ′ that two functions f, f ′ : A→ B are homotopic is shorthand
for the type
f ∼ f ′ :≡
∏
a:A
(f(a) =B f ′(a)).
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Proof. First, since WLOGPropUF and PropUA are themselves mere proposi-
tions in PropUF, (7) implies the logical equivalence between (9) and
WLOGPropUF ↔ PropUA.
Second, by applying (7) to A ' B in (6), we derive the logical equivalence
between
PropUA :≡ (A ' B) ↔ (A =PropUF B) and
PropUA↔ :≡ (A↔ B) ↔ (A =PropUF B).
Also by (7), WLOGPropUF is logically equivalent to the statement of WLOG
with A ' B replaced by A↔ B:
WLOG↔ :≡
∏
P :PropU→PropU
∏
A:PropU
P (A)→ ∏
B:PropU
(A↔ B)→ P (B)
 .
Thus, to prove the claim it suffices to prove the logically equivalent claim that
WLOG↔ ↔ PropUA↔ holds in PropUF.
Proof of PropUA↔ → WLOG↔. This follows by combining PropUA↔ with
HoTT’s induction principle [Uni, Chapter 1.12]. In particular, the induction
principle automatically implies
WLOG= :≡
:≡ ∏
P :PropU→PropU
∏
A:PropU
P (A)→ ∏
B:PropU
(A =PropUF B)→ P (B)
 .
(To see this, note that for fixed A : PropU , if P (A) holds of A : PropU , i.e., if
there is an inhabitant a : P (A), then defining
C :
∏
B:PropU
(A =PropUF B)→ PropU
C(B, p) :≡ P (B),
and taking a : C(A, reflA) ≡ P (A) allows us to apply based path induction
to obtain an inhabitant of∏
B:PropU
∏
p:A=PropUFB
C(B, p) ≡ ∏
B:PropU
(A =PropUF B)→ P (B),
as claimed.) By PropUA↔, we have (A ↔ B) ↔ (A =PropUF B), so that
WLOG= ↔ WLOG↔, yielding PropUA↔ → (WLOG= ↔ WLOG↔). 
Proof of WLOG↔ → PropUA↔. Fix A : PropU . To show the direction (A ↔
B) → (A =PropUF B) in PropUA↔, define P (B) :≡ (A =PropUF B). The
result follows automatically by WLOG↔ because P (A) ≡ (A =PropUF A)
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holds trivially by reflA. The converse (A =PropUF B) → (A ↔ B) holds by
based path induction at fixed A : PropU for P (B) :≡ (A↔ B). 
We have shown
WLOGPropUF ↔WLOG↔ ↔ PropUA↔ ↔ PropUA,
completing the proof. 
Concluding remarks. In the context of our running example, (8) is a rule
for constructing a proof that “Every set with exactly 3 distinct elements can
be ordered in exactly 6 distinct ways” from a proof that this statement is true
of a specific 3-element set. In particular, let A be the set {a1, a2, a3} and P
encode the property “can be ordered in exactly 6 ways”, so that P (A) asserts
that “A can be ordered in exactly 6 ways”. With this interpretation, the second
half of (8), expressed formally as∏
B:PropU
(A ' B)→ P (B),
translates to “For every B that is equivalent to A (i.e., for every B that is a set
with exactly 3 elements), the elements of B can be ordered in exactly 6 ways”.
To obtain this conclusion, it is enough to prove P (A), which we have done
by exhaustively listing all of the possibilities in (1). The formal expression of
WLOGPropUF in (8) thus makes the intuitive and obvious argument formally
rigorous in a way that cannot be achieved in ZFC.
A remaining open question regarding UF’s ability to satisfy (3) is whether
its internal notion of equivalence, given by homotopy equivalence, can serve in
the role of ‘X-theoretic equivalence’ for all practical instances of X. Tsementzis
took up this question in [Tse16, Section 5], noting that while there is a way
to make sense of ∼X in specific instances of ‘X’ (e.g., number theory, group
theory, category theory), and that this formalization of ∼X in UF does coincide
with ', there is no general algorithm to prove this for general ‘X’. Quoting
[Tse16] (with ∼X and ' substituted to be consistent with notation used here),
“It might now appear that the relevant question to ask is whether
' captures the meaning of our original informal notion ∼X ,
whatever that may be. In one sense, this question is impossible
to settle. There will always be room for a persistent skeptic to
doubt that this has been achieved: ‘Has the meaning of group
isomorphism as mathematicians understand it really been cap-
tured by the appropriate instance of homotopy equivalence in
UF?’ [...] And in another sense, the question has a trivial an-
swer. After all, the identity types in UF only ‘see’ those features
of the terms being considered that were used to define these
terms to begin with. And if we agree that the terms of [our
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formalization of the structure] adequately capture the features
of objects of the class [of structures] that we are interested in
(e.g. that they are sets, that they have a multiplicative opera-
tion etc.) then the identity type will ‘see’ all those features and
thus preserve them.”
So while we can never know for certain that all of mathematics can be suitably
encoded in UF, cf. [Tse16], several instances have already been demonstrated
without any clearcut examples in which the notion of identity implied by uni-
valence fails to coincide with what should be intuitively expected. From this
perspective, UF certainly provides a (little ‘f’) foundation of mathematical
practice, in the sense of encoding specific instances of WLOGX , when ‘X’ is
homotopy theory, category theory, set theory, number theory, group theory,
or graph theory [Uni, Tse16]. When combined with Theorem 1, these obser-
vations should inspire cautious optimism that UF can serve as a Foundation
of Mathematical Practice, both in the sense of (3) and in the broader sense
of “[permitting mathematicians] to do pretty much everything that [comes]
naturally for them to do.”
In making this latter assertion, I do not mean to suggest that mathemati-
cians want to argue using the notation or terminology of homotopy type theory,
or that such argumentation “comes naturally” to them. My point instead is
that the proof system of UF allows practicing mathematicians to do whatever
comes naturally without having to worry about it—as in the argument given
above for the number of orderings of a 3 element set or more generally by
appealing to “without loss of generality” when deemed appropriate.
By Theorem 1, the practitioner who argues WLOG could equivalently in-
voke the “structuralist” univalence axiom, and the structuralist who appeals
to univalence could just as well argue without loss of generality, as the prac-
titioner does. As such, practicing mathematicians face no dilemma between
“acquiescing” in the formalism of ZFC (and having to abandon WLOG) and
abandoning ZFC (and continuing to do what comes naturally). But a crisis
looms for the dogmatic set theorist who, by Theorem 1 and Burgess’s princi-
ple of indifference to identification quoted above, should be indifferent between
the identical identifications of the ‘structuralist’ axiom of univalence and the
‘pragmatist’ method of proof WLOG. Neither one is consistent with ZFC, but
the latter (and thus also the former) is ubiquitous in mathematical practice
and is handled seamlessly by the Univalent Foundations. On pain of hypocrisy
and logical inconsistency, the devout set theorist must either renounce WLOG,
and render himself hopeless for solving many mathematical problems, or else
acknowledge that the practice of mathematics is more consistent with the for-
malism of UF, and its “structuralist” axiom of univalence, than with that of
ZFC.
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